"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

Misrepresentation

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false.

 

Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

Statements of Fact

[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances.

 

Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.

 

Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.

 

Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

Crime or Fraud by Client

[3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.

 

Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client’s crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation.

 

Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client’s crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation.

 

Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like.

 

In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client’s crime or fraud.

 

If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

Louis Charles Hamilton II PLAINTIFF ORDER FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT No. A-180805

No. A-180805

Louis Charles Hamilton II                              IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff                                                               58^TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

V.

Joyce Guy & Edward McCray ET AL             OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

Defendants.

                                                      ORDER

            Came on to be Considered Plaintiff’s ”Writ of Attachment” ” and the Court, after review of the files, records, exhibit(s), and hearing on this Motion before The Honorable Court Entertainment.

            The 58^th District Court of Jefferson County Texas being of the opinion that said Plaintiff ”Writ of Attachment ” is with merit and should be granted, it is therefore Ordered

                                                                        1.

That Plaintiff’s ”Writ of Attachment” against the Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively Assets described as follows:

1.     Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)

2.     E and J Collectibles 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas

3.     SBD Port Arthur  City Block 210 Lot 8

4.     SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11

5.     SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10

6.     E and J Collectibles 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas

Are amend to the “Complaint and Summary Judgment” of this civil action in “Common Law” Docket No. A-180805 is fully Granted

                                                            2.

Ordered that Civil Judgment levy against Defendant(s) “Joyce M Guy and Edward McCray” herein being in favor of the Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II being fully recorded in the Court records at the “Clerk of Court” office of Jefferson County Texas.

                                                            3.

Ordered This “Writ of Attachment” being fully enforced to cover any and all Civil Monetary Judgment(s) as assigned by the “Honorable 58^th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas” herein to physically seize the said “attachment ownership property(s) and dwelling described as:

7.     SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11

8.     SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10

9.     Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)

10.            E and J Collectibles 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas

11.            SBD Port Arthur  City Block 210 Lot 8

 

4.

Ordered the “Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office to fully secure and evict, all unknown “Person and or Person(s)” having, possession, custody, and control over the described “Attachment ownership property(s)” of the Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” collectively herein

12.            SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10

13.            Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)

14.            E and J Collectibles 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas

15.            SBD Port Arthur  City Block 210 Lot 8

16.            SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11

Being physically removed them from the “Ownership Property(s)”, and execute further sales thereof said Properties to cover all Judgment cost of the “Honorable Court”.

And covering any and all Sherriff’s Office Cost derived thereof in the Execution of this “Writ of Attachment” and any other cost Sherriff’s Office incurred for such sales as required by the court during this civil action as directed by this Honorable Court.

 

 

 As so Order by this Court.

 

 

 

 

Signed this _______day of __________________2015

 

 

 

 

                                                __________________________________

                                                                       W. Kent Walston

                                                               58^th Judicial District Court

                                                                Jefferson County Texas

                                                              Presiding Honorable Judge

                                                                       

 

Louis Charles Hamilton II PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT No. A-180805

  

No. A-180805
Louis Charles Hamilton II Plaintiff

IN THE 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS 

V.
Joyce Guy & Edward McCray ET AL            
Defendants. 

Writ of Attachment
Comes Now Before the Honorable 58th District Court the Pro Se Plaintiff, Louis Charles Hamilton II,
Motion before the Honorable Court, for a “Writ of Attachment”, being enforced on the Property(s) located at
1. SBD Port Arthur City Block 210 Lot 8
2. SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11
3. SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10
4. Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)
As described in Pro Se Plaintiff attached exhibit(s) (A1-A2) herein “Jefferson County Texas Property search Index of the Defendant “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray”
And for just cause the Pro Se Plaintiff state as Follows:
1. Defendant(s) “Joyce Guy and Edward McCray” having “Actual Damages” being owed to the Plaintiff in the Amount of $11,024.00 with full 6% interest rate incurred since date of injury November 16th 2007 To include but not limited to the “Actual Theft” of the Plaintiff entire Construction Company set of tools in excess of $3093.00 Dollars
2. Defendant(s) “Joyce Guy and Edward McCray” having “Actual Damages” being owed to the Plaintiff in the Amount of $336,000.00 minimal lost wages and lost earning capacity” per year with full 6% interest rate incurred since date of injury November 17th 2007
3. This do not include, or exempt any exemplary, intentional infliction, mental anguish, physical assault & battery upon the Plaintiff person, just awards and damages the Pro Se Plaintiff may be entitled in addition to Actual damages as described in Paragraph (1) and (2) above.
Defendant(s) further collectively seeks to fully abscond Justice of this Honorable Court” to avoid paying “any real damages ever” for such “Thievery” and their combine extreme and outrageous conduct as described by the Plaintiff now ongoing over 7 years “Joyce Guy and Edward McCray” collectively caused “among other things” Pro Se Plaintiff extreme hardship and financial ruin suffrage of his “Independent Construction Company”
Pro Se Plaintiff State, Affirm and Declare this entire case civil suit in common law with the State of Texas Docket No. A-180805 is a complete package “Complex Fraudulent” scam and scheme of things of the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas as fully described in Pro Se Plaintiff attached exhibit (A) herein namely: Hamilton v. Freeman et al
Filed: December 3, 2014 as 1:2014cv00592
Defendant: Joyce M Guy, Antoine L Freeman, Edward McCray
Plaintiff: Louis Charles Hamilton, II
Cause of Action: Violation of Civil Rights
Court: Fifth Circuit › Texas › Texas Eastern District Court
Type: Other Statutes › Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

With court records of the 58th Judicial District Court being supporting exhibit(s) on Filed with the U.S. Clerk of Court in support of the Pro Se Plaintiff Motion and (TRO) order to Freeze all records, documents and Assets of the described Defendant “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein and the former Attorney of record Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas Bar No. 24058299
Defendant(s) collectively own the described numerous additional “properties” with clear deeds which are not consider their primary “homestead” as that being of 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas
Wherefore Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II Respectfully Moves the Honorable Court herein for a “Writ of Attachment”, being enforced on the additional Property(s) located at
5. SBD Port Arthur City Block 210 Lot 8
6. SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11
7. SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10
8. Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)
Against Defendant(s) “Joyce M Guy and Edward McCray” herein in favor of the Pro Se Plaintiff being fully recorded in the Court records at the “Clerk of Court” office of Jefferson County Texas
This “Writ of Attachment” being fully enforced to cover any and all Civil Monetary Judgment(s) as assigned by the “Honorable 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas” herein to physically seize the said “attachment ownership property(s) and dwelling described as:
9. SBD Port Arthur City Block 210 Lot 8
10. SBD Port Arthur City Block 94 Lot 11
11. SBD Lakeview Block 4 Lot 10
12. Lot 10 Block 18 Jeff Chaison ADD (Paragon Business Inc.)
To include but not limited to the “Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office to fully secure and evict, all unknown “Person and or Person(s)” having, possession, custody, and control over the described
“Attachment ownership property(s)” of the Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” being physically removed them from the “Ownership Property(s)”, and execute further sales thereof said Properties to cover all Judgment cost of the “Honorable Court”.
And covering any and all Sherriff’s Office Cost derived thereof in the Execution of this “Writ of Attachment” and any other cost Sherriff’s Office incurred for such sales as required by the court during this civil action as directed by this Honorable Court.
Wherefore Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II Respectfully Moves, Prays,
The Honorable Court for any further, just, proper devise to secure Plaintiff “Writ of Attachment”
Until this Civil Dispute has reach a Full, Final and Complete Judgment render Before This Honorable 58th District Court of Jefferson County Texas
Notice of Motion
To: Defendant(s) “Joyce Guy and Edward McCray”
Take Notice: That a Civil Hearing before the Honorable 58th District Court of Jefferson County Texas is set at 9:00 am February 19th 2015
By the Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II herein
For the “Honorable Court” to view and reach a Judgment, on this “Writ of Attachment”

By, _______________________________
Louis Charles Hamilton II
Pro Se Plaintiff
P.O. Box 17524
Sugar Land Texas 77496

"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

RICO’s legislative history and plain statutory language show that it was not solely designed for use against organized crime.

 RICO specifically allows either private parties or the government to bring civil cases in different contexts.

 As Justice Brennan stated for the Court in the 1989 case H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, limiting RICO to organized crime “finds no support in the Act’s text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history.”

 This is similar to the federal antitrust laws, upon which RICO was modeled, which permits criminal and civil cases along with similar remedies, such as injunctions, triple damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.

Civil RICO permits a “person [including corporations] damaged in his business or property” to sue one or more “racketeers.”  The plaintiff must prove an existing “enterprise” which the racketeers used to engage in a pattern of illegal activities.

 RICO permits racketeers to be tried either criminally (by the government) or civilly (by either the government or private parties)

 for illegal acts which he or she ordered, assisted, or conspired with others to do, even if the racketeer did not himself commit the acts.

"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

Client-Lawyer Relationship
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality Of Information - Comment

[1]  This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client,

 Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

[2]  A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.

The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct.

Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

[3]  The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics.

 The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.

The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.

A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.

[4]  Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person.

A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

Authorized Disclosure

[5]  Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation.

In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

Disclosure Adverse to Client

[6]  Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.

Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.

 Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.

[7]  Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d),

 that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule.

The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client’s misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer’s obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.

[8]  Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client’s crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated.

In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.

[9]  A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[10]  Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense.

The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together.

 The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.

[11]   A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

[12]   Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

Detection of Conflicts of Interest

[13]   Paragraph (b)(7) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice.  See Rule 1.17, Comment [7].

 Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred.  Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. 

Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that might arise from the possible new relationship.  Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced;

 that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person's intentions are known to the person's spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge).  Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent.  A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these Rules.

[14]   Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b)(7) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest.  Paragraph (b)(7) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b)(7). 

Paragraph (b)(7) also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [5], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation.

[15]   A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure.

Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law.

In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

[16]   Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose.

If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

[17]   Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question.

 A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).

Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality

[18]   Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.

  The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure.

 Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).

A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law,

such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules.  For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information with nonlawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-[4].       

[19]   When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.

Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.

A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.

Former Client

[20]   The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal

consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

• shall not counsel to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.

• shall not knowingly assist a client in such conduct.

• When an attorney allows his client to give false sworn testimony or file false sworn affidavits, he is sanctioning the crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice by his client, and this violates the Rules.

• When an attorney allows his client to destroy or withhold documents that the client is obligated to produce, he is sanctioning the crimes of tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice.

• When an attorney allows his client to falsify documents or file bogus documents, he is sanctioning the crimes of tampering with evidence, obstruction of justice, and perhaps forgery.

• When an attorney knows his client is lying, concealing evidence, obstructing justice, violating any criminal statute, or committing fraud in any way, the attorney has an ethical obligation to

tell the client that this cannot be allowed.

In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (a) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is

obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;

(b) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

Disclosure to prevent a crime, tort, or fraud

The crime-fraud exception can render the privilege moot when communications between an attorney and client are themselves used to further a crime, tort, or fraud. In Clark v. United States, the

US Supreme Court writes that "A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told."


The crime-fraud exception also does require that the crime or fraud discussed between client and attorney be carried out to be triggered

"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain (adjectival form fraudulent; to defraud is the verb).

As a legal construct, fraud is both a civil wrong (i.e., a fraud victim may sue the fraud perpetrator to avoid the fraud and/or recover monetary compensation) and a criminal wrong (i.e., a fraud

perpetrator may be prosecuted and imprisoned by governmental authorities). Defrauding people or organizations of money or valuables is the usual purpose of fraud, but it sometimes instead

involves obtaining benefits without actually depriving anyone of money or valuables, such as obtaining a drivers license by way of false statements made in an application for the same.

A hoax is a distinct concept that involves deception without the intention of gain or of materially damaging or depriving the victim.

In common law jurisdictions, as a civil wrong, fraud is referred to as a tort. While the precise definitions and requirements of proof vary among jurisdictions, the requisite elements of fraud as a tort

generally are the intentional misrepresentation or concealment of an important fact upon which the victim is meant to rely, and in fact does rely, to the harm of the victim.

Proving fraud in a court of law is often said to be difficult.

That difficulty is found, for instance, in that each and every one of the elements of fraud must be proven, that the elements include proving the states of mind of the perpetrator and the victim, and

that some jurisdictions require the victim to prove fraud with so-called clear and convincing evidence.

The remedies for fraud may include rescission (i.e., reversal) of a fraudulently obtained agreement or transaction, the recovery of a monetary award to compensate for the harm caused, punitive

damages to punish or deter the misconduct, and possibly others.

In cases of a fraudulently induced contract, fraud may serve as a defense in a civil action for breach of contract or specific performance of contract.

Fraud may serve as a basis for a court to invoke its equitable jurisdiction

The burden of proof (Latin: onus probandi) is the imperative on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will shift the conclusion away from the default position to one's own position.

The burden of proof is often associated with the Latin maxim semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, the best translation of which seems to be: "the necessity of proof always lies with the

person who lays charges.”

He who does not carry the burden of proof carries the benefit of assumption, meaning he needs no evidence to support his claim. Fulfilling the burden of proof effectively captures the benefit of

assumption, passing the burden of proof off to another party.

The term "burden of proof" is used to mean two kinds of burdens: The burden of production and the burden of persuasion.

A "burden of persuasion" or "risk of nonpersuasion" is an obligation that remains on a single party for the duration of the claim. Once the burden has been entirely discharged to the satisfaction of

the trier of fact, the party carrying the burden will succeed in its claim.

For example, the presumption of innocence places a legal burden upon the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense (generally beyond a reasonable doubt) and to disprove all the defenses

except for affirmative defenses in which the proof of non-existence of all affirmative defense(s) is not constitutionally required of the prosecution.

The burden of persuasion should not be confused with the evidential burden, or burden of production, or duty of producing evidence

which is an obligation that shifts between parties over the course of the hearing or trial. The evidential burden is the burden to adduce sufficient evidence to properly raise an issue at court.

Burden of proof refers most generally to the obligation of a party to prove its allegations at trial. In a civil case the plaintiff sets forth its allegations in a complaint, petition or other pleading. The

defendant is then required to file a responsive pleading denying some or all of the allegations and setting forth any affirmative facts in defense. Each party has the burden of proof of their

allegations.

Reasonable suspicion is a low standard of proof to determine whether a brief investigative stop or search by a police officer or any government agent is warranted. It is important to note that this

stop and/or search must be brief; its thoroughness is proportional to, and limited by, the low standard of evidence. A more definite standard of proof (often probable cause) would be required to

justify a more thorough stop/search.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable, and individualized suspicion that crime is afoot. A mere guess or "hunch" is not

enough to constitute reasonable suspicion.

An investigatory stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The state must justify the seizure by showing that the officer conducting the stop had a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal

activity was afoot. The important point is that officers cannot deprive a citizen of liberty unless the officer can point to specific facts and circumstances and inferences there from that would amount

to a reasonable suspicion.

The officer must be prepared to establish that criminal activity was a logical explanation for what he perceived. The requirement serves to prevent officers from stopping individuals based merely on

hunches or unfounded suspicions. The purpose of the stop and detention is to investigate to the extent necessary to confirm or dispel the original suspicion. If the initial confrontation with the

person stopped dispels suspicion of criminal activity the officer must end the detention and allow the person to go about his or her business.

If the investigation confirms the officer's initial suspicion or reveals evidence that would justify continued detention the officer may require the person detained to remain at the scene until further

investigation is complete. In some cases, the investigation may develop sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause.

In Arizona v. Gant (2009) the United States Supreme Court defined a new standard, that of "reasonable to believe." This standard applies only to vehicle searches after the suspect has been placed

under arrest and overruled New York v. Belton by saying it must be "reasonable to believe" there is more evidence in the vehicle of the crime the suspect was arrested for. Only then are police

officers allowed to go back and search a vehicle incident to a suspect's arrest.

There is still an ongoing debate as to the exact meaning of this phrase. Some courts have said it should be a new standard while others have equated it with the "reasonable suspicion" of the Terry

stop. Most courts have agreed it is somewhere less than probable cause.

Probable cause is a relatively low standard of proof, which is used in the United States to determine whether a search, or an arrest, is warranted. It is also used by grand juries to determine

whether to issue an indictment. In the civil context, this standard is often used where plaintiffs are seeking a prejudgement remedy.

In the criminal context, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), determined that probable cause requires "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found" in deciding whether Drug Enforcement Administration agents had a reason to execute a search. Courts vary when determining what constitutes a "fair probability": some say 30%,

others 40%, others 51%.

A good illustration of this evidence/intrusiveness continuum might be a typical police/citizen interaction. Consider the following three interactions:

• no level of suspicion required: a consensual encounter between officer and citizen

• reasonable suspicion required: a stop initiated by the officer that would cause a reasonable person not to feel free to leave

• probable cause required: arrest.

One of the least reliable standards of proof, this assessment is often used in administrative law, and often in Child Protective Services (CPS) proceedings in some states. The "some credible

evidence" standard is used as a legal placeholder to bring some controversy before a trier of fact, and into a legal process. It is on the order of the factual standard of proof needed to achieve a

finding of "probable cause" used in ex parte threshold determinations needed before a court will issue a search warrant.

It is a lower standard of proof than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The standard does not require the fact-finder to weigh conflicting evidence, and merely requires the investigator

or prosecutor to present the bare minimum of material credible evidence to support the allegations against the subject, or in support of the allegation; see Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2nd Cir.
1994).

In some Federal Appellate Circuit Courts, such as the Second Circuit, the "some credible evidence" standard has been found constitutionally insufficient to protect liberty interests of the parties in controversy at CPS hearings.

In some appeals from decisions of administrative agencies, the courts apply a "substantial evidence" standard of review of the agency's factual findings. In the United States, for example, if a Social Security Disability Insurance claimant is found "not disabled" (and, therefore, ineligible for benefits)

by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the claimant appeals, both the Appeals Council (the body within the Social Security Administration that hears appeals from decisions of ALJs)

and the Federal courts (which, in this type of case, will normally hear an appeal only after the claimant has exhausted all administrative remedies)

 will look to see whether the administrative law judge's decision was supported by "substantial evidence" or not. Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Preponderance of the evidence, also known as balance of probabilities is the standard required in most civil cases, and in family court determinations solely involving money, such as child support under the Child Support Standards Act.

The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true.

Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is true. Lord Denning, in Miller v. Minister of Pensions,

described it simply as "more probable than not." Until 1970, this was also the standard used in juvenile court in the United States.

This is also the standard of proof used when determining eligibility of unemployment benefits for a former employee accused of losing their job through alleged misconduct.

 In most US states, the employer must prove this case based on preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof used for immunity from prosecution under Florida's controversial stand-your-ground law.

 The defense must present their evidence in a pre-trial hearing, show that the statutory prerequisites have been met, and then request that the court grant a motion for declaration of immunity.

The judge must then decide based on the preponderance of the evidence whether to grant immunity.

This is a far lower burden than "beyond a reasonable doubt," the threshold prosecutors must meet at any proceeding criminal trial.
Clear and convincing evidence is a higher level of burden of persuasion than "preponderance of the evidence".

It is employed intra-adjudicatively in administrative court determinations, as well as in civil and certain criminal procedure in the United States. For example, a prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief from capital punishment must prove his factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

This standard is used in many types of equity cases, including paternity, persons in need of supervision, juvenile delinquency, child custody, the probate of both wills and living wills, petitions to remove a person from life support ("right to die" cases),and many similar cases.

Clear and convincing proof means that the evidence presented by a party during the trial must be highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality.

In this standard, a greater degree of believability must be met than the common standard of proof in civil actions, which only requires that the facts as a threshold be more likely than not to prove the issue for which they are asserted.

This standard is also known as "clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence"; "clear, cognizant, and convincing evidence"; and "clear, unequivocal, satisfactory, and convincing evidence", and is applied in cases or situations involving an equitable remedy or where a presumptive civil liberty interest exists.

This is the highest standard used as the burden of proof in Anglo-American jurisprudence and typically only applies in criminal proceedings. It has been described, in negative terms, as a proof having been met if there is no plausible reason to believe otherwise.

If there is a real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, in a case, then the level of proof has not been met.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that one would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of one's own affairs.

However, it does not mean an absolute certainty. The standard that must be met by the prosecution's evidence in a criminal prosecution is that no other logical explanation can be derived from the

facts except that the defendant committed the crime, thereby overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent unless and until proven guilty.

If the trier of fact has no doubt as to the defendant's guilt, or if their only doubts are unreasonable doubts, then the prosecutor has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant should be pronounced guilty.

The term connotes that evidence establishes a particular point to a moral certainty which precludes the existence of any reasonable alternatives. It does not mean that no doubt exists as to the

accused's guilt, but only that no reasonable doubt is possible from the evidence presented.

Further to this notion of moral certainty, where the trier of fact relies on proof that is solely circumstantial, i.e., when conviction is based entirely on circumstantial evidence, certain jurisdictions

specifically require the prosecution's burden of proof to be such that the facts proved must exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis or inference other than guilt.

The main reason that this high level of proof is demanded in criminal trials is that such proceedings can result in the deprivation of a defendant's liberty or even in his or her death.

These outcomes are far more severe than in civil trials, in which monetary damages are the common remedy.

Beyond the shadow of a doubt is the strictest standard of proof. It requires that there be no doubt as to the issue.

Widely considered an impossible standard, a situation stemming from the nature of knowledge itself, it is valuable to mention only as a comment on the fact that evidence in a court never need (nor can) reach this level.

This phrase, has, nonetheless, come to be associated with the law in popular culture.

"U.S. District Court" Louis Charles Hamilton II vs. Antoine L. Freeman J. D. (Attorney at Law) Texas Bar No. 24058299 et al

In United States law, federal-question jurisdiction is the subject-matter jurisdiction of United States federal courts to hear

a civil case because the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the United States Constitution, federal law, or a treaty to which the United States is a party.

Article III of the United States Constitution permits federal courts to hear such cases, so long as the United States Congress passes a statute to that effect.

However, when Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the newly created federal courts to hear such cases,

it initially chose not to allow the lower federal courts to possess federal question jurisdiction for fear that it would make the courts too powerful.

The Federalists briefly created such jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1801, but it was repealed the following year, and not restored until 1875.

The statute is now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

Unlike diversity jurisdiction, which is based on the parties coming from different states, federal question jurisdiction

no longer has any amount in controversy requirement—Congress eliminated this

requirement in actions against the United States in 1976, and in all federal question cases in 1980.

Therefore, a federal court can hear a federal question case even if no money is sought by the plaintiff.

To meet the requirement of a case "arising under" federal law, the federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint.

There has been considerable dispute over what constitutes a "federal question" in these circumstances,

But it is now settled law that the plaintiff cannot seek the jurisdiction of a federal court merely because

it anticipates that the defendant is going to raise a defense based on the Constitution, or on a federal statute.

This "well-pleaded complaint" rule has been criticized by legal scholars, but Congress has so far

chosen not to change the law, although the Supreme Court has made clear it is free to do so.

Amount in controversy (sometimes called jurisdictional amount) is a term used in United States

civil procedure to denote the amount at stake in a lawsuit, in particular in connection with a

requirement that persons seeking to bring a lawsuit in a particular court must be suing for a certain minimum amount before that court may hear the case.

Where a single plaintiff has multiple unrelated claims against a single defendant, that plaintiff can aggregate those claims -

that is, add the amounts together - to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.

In cases involving more than one defendant, a plaintiff may aggregate the amount claimed against multiple defendants

“only if the defendants are jointly liable.” Middle Tennessee News Co., Inc. v.

Charnel of Cincinnati, Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001).

However, “if the defendants are severally liable, plaintiff must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement against each individual defendant.”

The recent 5-4 decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005),

held that a federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims of other plaintiffs who do not meet

the jurisdictional amount for a diversity action, when at least one plaintiff in the action does satisfy the jurisdictional amount.

The standard for dismissing a complaint for lack of meeting the amount in controversy is a rather high one in federal court.

In 1938, Justice Owen Roberts set forth the "legal-certainty test", which is still used today:

It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.

The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.

Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim.

But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if,

from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the

plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed.

The validity of the amount of damages claimed is considered a threshold issue of law for a judge to decide at the commencement of the case.

The legal certainty test is often heavily litigated in personal injury or wrongful death cases,

in the situation where they are removed by a defendant to federal court on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction, and then the plaintiff moves to remand to state court.

Since the 1970s, many states have prohibited plaintiffs in such cases from demanding a specific amount of money in the ad damnum section of their complaints,

Because of serious problems with unscrupulous attorneys gaining undue publicity by simply demanding outrageous and unrealistic damage amounts like $1 trillion.

Therefore, many such complaints cannot and do not state an amount in controversy on their face,

Which puts defendants in the awkward position of having to submit evidence to the federal court that plaintiffs could theoretically recover $75,000,

while simultaneously maintaining that plaintiffs

are not entitled to anything at all.

Each state has the power to set its own amount in controversy requirements for its own courts,

but every state must offer some outlet for citizens to sue for violations of their rights, even if they

are seeking no money.

Most states have several levels of trial courts, with different amount-in-controversy requirements

which must be met to gain access to higher levels of courts. For example, in the state of Virginia,

the lowest level of court, the Virginia General District Court has

exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases where the amount in controversy is $4,500 or less,

And shares authority with the Virginia Circuit Court to try cases involving sums above $4,500 and up to $25,000.

The Virginia Circuit Court, in turn, has exclusive jurisdiction where the amount in

controversy is greater than $25,000.

A few states like California have felt that it is more efficient to unify all trial courts so that judges and support staff can be more easily reassigned where needed.

However, in California, nearly all lawsuits involving an amount in controversy below $25,000 are classified as

"limited civil actions," which are subject to special simplified procedural rules intended

to hold down litigation costs.

A court order is an official proclamation by a judge (or panel of judges) that defines the legal relationships between the parties to a hearing,

a trial, an appeal or other court proceedings. Such ruling

requires or authorizes the carrying out of certain steps by one or more parties to a case.

A court order must be signed by a judge; some jurisdiction may require it to be notarized.

The content and provisions of a court order depend on the type of proceeding, the phase of the proceedings in which they are issued,

and the procedural and evidentiary rules that govern the

proceedings.

An order can be as simple as setting a date for trial or as complex as restructuring contractual relationships by and

between many corporations in a multi-jurisdictional dispute. It may be a final

order (one that concludes the court action), or an interim order (one during the action).

Most orders are written, and are signed by the judge. Some orders, however, are spoken orally by the judge in open court,

and are only reduced to writing in the transcript of the proceedings.

A transcript is a written record of spoken language. In court proceedings, a transcript is usually a record of all decisions of the judge,

and the spoken arguments by the litigants' lawyers. A related

term used in the United States is docket, not a full transcript.

The transcript is expected to be an exact and unedited record of every spoken word, with each speaker indicated.

Such a record was originally made by court stenographers who used a form of

shorthand abbreviation to write as quickly as people spoke.

Today, most court reporters use a specialized machine with a phonetic key system, typing a key or key combination for every sound a person utters.

Many courts worldwide have now begun to use

digital recording systems.

The recordings are archived and are sent to court reporters or transcribers only when a transcript is requested.

Many US transcripts are indexed by Deposition Source so that they may be searched by legal professionals via the Internet.

Transcripts may be available publicly or to a restricted group of persons;

a fee may be charged.

Transcripts may also be produced digitally. Transcripts produced by a digital reporter are often more accurate than those produced by a court stenographer.

A transcript is also any written record of a speech, debate or discussion.

Rush transcripts are transcript requests that can be processed and mailed, or picked up, within short time of the request

(usually 24 hours or less), provided there are no extenuating circumstances

(such as unpaid bills).

These expedited transcripts normally cost much more than regular transcripts.

Check against delivery

Sometimes, the first page of a transcript will have the words "Check Against Delivery" stamped across it,

which means that the transcript is not the legal representation of the speech, but rather

only the audio delivery is regarded as the official record.

This is better explained in the French version of the message – Seul le texte prononcé fait foi, literally "Only the spoken text is faithful".

Conversely, it may be that the actual given speech differs from the way the speaker intended,

or that it contains extra information that is not pertinent to the central points of the speech and that

the speaker does not want to be left as a permanent record.

Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, Cause No. 1:14-CV-592 To Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman

Request Number 253.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was

(Only) acting in the “legal capacitates” as a Attorney at Law to file a General Denial (Only) on December 18th 2007

To “simply” reply in the Complaint A-180805 made against Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively

and such “legal attorney at law retain services” ended thereafter the exact date of December 18th 2007

And that said Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Texas Bar No. 24058299 herein

was not on any “court transcript recording” of “Anita Becker” on the hearing date of

exactly August 28th 2009 before the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas Docket No. A-180805

In which “You” Defendant (Attorney at law) herein admit “You” did not “cross examine” a “Subpoena Witness” herein

namely one “Allen T. Guy” natural brother to the Co-Defendant “Joyce M. Guy” herein.

In the term Subpena - (subpoena): (suh-pea-nah) n. an order of the court for a witness to appear at a particular time

and place to testify and/or produce documents in the control of the witness (if

a "subpena duces tecum").

A subpena is used to obtain testimony from a witness at both depositions (testimony under oath taken outside of court) and at trial.

Subpenas are usually issued automatically by the court clerk but must be served personally on the party being summoned.

Failure to appear as required by the subpena can be punished as contempt of court if it appears the absence was intentional or without cause.

In the term Cross-Examination - n. the opportunity for the attorney (or an unrepresented party)

to ask questions in court of a witness who has testified in a trial on behalf of the opposing party.

The questions on cross-examination are limited to the subjects covered in the direct examination of the witness,

but importantly, the attorney may ask leading questions, in which he/she is allowed

to suggest answers or put words in the witness's mouth.

(For example, "Isn't it true that you told Mrs. Jones she had done nothing wrong?"

which is leading, as compared to "Did you say anything to Mrs. Jones?") A strong cross-examination (often called just "cross" by lawyers and judges)

can force contradictions, expressions of doubts or even complete obliteration of a witness's prior carefully rehearsed testimony.

On the other hand, repetition of a witness’s story, vehemently defended, can strengthen his/her credibility.

In the term Testimony - n. oral evidence given under oath by a witness in answer to questions posed by attorneys at trial

or at a deposition (questioning under oath outside of court).

In the term Testify - v. to give oral evidence under oath in answer to questions posed by attorneys either at trial or at a deposition

(testimony under oath outside of court), with the opportunity for

opposing attorneys to cross-examine the witness in regard to answers given.

In the term Transcript - n. the written record of all proceedings, including testimony, in a trial,

hearing or deposition (out-of-court testimony under oath). Jurisdictions vary as to whether the

attorneys' final arguments are recorded, with the Federal Court Reporter Act, but not all states, requiring inclusion.

A copy of the transcript may be ordered from the court reporter and a fee paid for the transcription and first copy;

if the opposing party also wants a copy, the cost will not include the transcription fee.

In most appeals a copy of the transcript is required so that the court of appeals can review the entire proceedings in the trial court.

Copies of depositions may be ordered for a fee from the court

reporter who took down the testimony. Transcripts are not printed from the record unless transcription is requested

And that said Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Texas Bar No. 24058299 herein

the term Testimony, In the term Testify, In the term Cross-Examination, In the term Transcript,

In the term Subpena being fully not involved thereof, or making any legal representation, presentation,

as acting “Attorney of record” on any “court transcript recording” of “Anita Becker” on the

hearing date of exactly August 28th 2009 appearing before “Judge Bob Wortham” of the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas.

Request Number 254.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was (Only) acting in the “legal capacitates”

as a Attorney at Law to file a General Denial (Only) on December 18th 2007

To “simply” reply in the Complaint A-180805 made against Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively

and such “legal attorney at law retain services” ended

thereafter the exact date of December 18th 2007

And that said Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively

was acting “Pro Se” on “court transcript recording” of “Anita Becker” on the hearing date of exactly August 28

th 2009 before the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas Docket No. A-180805

In which “You” Chief Defendant (Attorney at law) herein admit that said Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively

was acting “Pro Se” and physically “cross examine”

a “Subpoena Witness” herein namely one “Allen T. Guy” natural brother to the Co-Defendant “Joyce M. Guy” herein.

In the term Subpena - (subpoena): (suh-pea-nah) n. an order of the court for a witness to appear at a particular time

and place to testify and/or produce documents in the control of the witness (if

a "subpena duces tecum").

A subpena is used to obtain testimony from a witness at both depositions (testimony under oath taken outside of court) and at trial.

Subpenas are usually issued automatically by the court clerk but

must be served personally on the party being summoned.

Failure to appear as required by the subpena can be punished as contempt of court if it appears the absence was intentional or without cause.

In the term Cross-Examination - n. the opportunity for the attorney (or an unrepresented party)

to ask questions in court of a witness who has testified in a trial on behalf of the opposing party.

The questions on cross-examination are limited to the subjects covered in the direct examination of the witness,

but importantly, the attorney may ask leading questions, in which he/she is allowed

to suggest answers or put words in the witness's mouth.

(For example, "Isn't it true that you told Mrs. Jones she had done nothing wrong?" which is leading, as compared to

"Did you say anything to Mrs. Jones?") A strong cross-examination (often called

just "cross" by lawyers and judges) can force contradictions, expressions of doubts

or even complete obliteration of a witness's prior carefully rehearsed testimony.

On the other hand, repetition of a witness’s story, vehemently defended, can strengthen his/her credibility.

In the term Testimony - n. oral evidence given under oath by a witness in answer to questions

posed by attorneys at trial or at a deposition (questioning under oath outside of court).

In the term Testify - v. to give oral evidence under oath in answer to questions posed by attorneys either at trial or at a deposition

(testimony under oath outside of court), with the opportunity for

opposing attorneys to cross-examine the witness in regard to answers given.

In the term Transcript - n. the written record of all proceedings, including testimony, in a trial,

hearing or deposition (out-of-court testimony under oath). Jurisdictions vary as to whether the

attorneys' final arguments are recorded, with the Federal Court Reporter Act, but not all states, requiring inclusion.

A copy of the transcript may be ordered from the court reporter and a fee paid for the transcription and first copy;

if the opposing party also wants a copy, the cost will not include the transcription fee.

In most appeals a copy of the transcript is required so that the court of appeals can review the entire proceedings in the trial court.

Copies of depositions may be ordered for a fee from the court

reporter who took down the testimony. Transcripts are not printed from the record unless transcription is requested

And that said Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Texas Bar No. 24058299 herein

In the term Testimony, in the term Testify, in the term Cross-Examination, in the term Transcript, in the term Subpoena

“You” being fully not involved thereof, or making any legal representation, presentation, as acting “Attorney of record” on any “court transcript recording” of “Anita Becker” on the hearing date of

exactly August 28th 2009 appearing before “Judge Bob Wortham” of the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas

And it was in fact said Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively was acting

“Pro Se” and fully involved In the term Testimony, In the term Testify, In the term Cross-

Examination, In the term Transcript, In the term Subpoena of witness “Allen T. Guy” named herein.


By, _______________________________

Louis Charles Hamilton II
Pro Se Plaintiff
P.O. Box 17524
Sugar Land Texas 77496

Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, Cause No. 1:14-CV-592 To Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman

Request Number 238.

Admit:

Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Bar No. 24058299 herein was not acting;

In that term Attorney - n. an agent or someone authorized to act for another a person

who has been qualified by a state or federal court to provide legal services, including appearing in court.

In that term Attorney of Record - n. the attorney who has appeared in court and/or signed pleadings or other forms on behalf of a client.

The lawyer remains the attorney of record until some other attorney or the client substitutes for him/her,

He/she is allowed by the court to withdraw, or after the case is closed.

In that term Attorney's Fee - n. The payment for legal services, hourly charge,

and flat fee for the performance of a particular service some mixture of hourly and contingent fee or other combination.

A "retainer" is a down payment on fees, often required by the attorney in order to make sure he or she is not left holding the bag for work performed,

or at least as a good faith indication that the client is serious and can afford the services.

In the term Attorney's Work Product - n. written materials, charts, notes of conversations and investigations,

and other materials directed toward preparation of a case or other legal representation.

In the term Attorney-Client Privilege - n. the requirement that an attorney may not reveal communications,

conversations and letters between himself/ herself and his/her client, under the theory

that a person should be able to speak freely and honestly with his/her attorney without fear of future revelation.

In the term Defense - n. a general term for the effort of an attorney representing a defendant during trial and in pre-trial maneuvers

to defeat the party suing, to counter, defeat or remove all or a part of the contentions of the plaintiff.

And you were fully not in that term “Attorney of Record”, a party thereof from December 18th 2007 throughout

the exact dates in time of November 13th 2009 10:22 AM when you file a “Motion for Withdrawal” in cause No. A-180805…?

Request Number 239.

Admit:

That your clients “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively namely being “Co-Defendant(s)

Were “physically legally” acting as their own “counsel of record” for their very own collectively “legal civil interest behalf”

appearing as such in their own “Pro Se” persons excluding “Your” Attorney

at Law skilled representation and they appearing before the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas

in a civil suit in common law docket No A-180805 being filed November 26th 2007

Namely in that term of appearing in their own person/persons as Pro Se thereafter the date of December 18th 2007

Namely in that term of Pro Se, Pro se legal representation (/ˌproʊ ˈsiː/ or /ˌproʊ ˈseɪ/)

means advocating on one's own behalf before a court, rather than being represented by a lawyer

namely “You” Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Bar No. 24058299 herein

As “Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively “Appeared”

official Pro Se before the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas in a civil suit in common law docket No A-180805

As “Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively “Appeared” before The “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham”

in a legal format as described now by you and contentions being

admitted herein

As such said Co-Defendant(s) collectively being said Pro Se counsel of record fully acting as such for their very own

“legal interest” against the said Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II herein

from the exact the exact “time frame dates” of December 19th 2007 throughout December 11th 2009…

Request Number 240.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not filing any legal court documents

for their legal behalf of said Co-Defendant(s) collectively through

the “United States Mailing System” thereafter December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009

And forwarding such to the “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham, to the “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham” staff namely

“Ms. Sydney Moreau”, to The Jefferson County Clerk of Court “Lolita Ramos”,

And all (active) Deputy Clerks acting on behalf of said Jefferson County Clerk of Court “Lolita Ramos, involved in the records thereof,

Namely” the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas “Case Ledger” for Cause No. A-180805

Namely” the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas “Civil Docket report” for cause No. A-180805

With Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein directly not having any

physical Usage of the “United States Mailing System” surround civil court event thereafter

December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 for their “legal behalf”

of said Co-Defendant(s) collectively through the “United States Mailing System”

Request Number 241.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not physically involved with

inner actions on live “court transcripts” with the 58th Court reporters “Anita

Becker” thereafter December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 for the

Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” legal behalf” in cause No. A-180805.

Namely on hearing dates of August 28th, 2009

Request Number 242.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not physically involved with

inner actions on live “court transcripts” with the 58th Court reporters “Anita

Becker” thereafter December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009

for the Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” legal behalf” in cause No. A-180805.

Namely on hearing date of September 11th 2009

Request Number 243.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not present before the

58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas bailiff’s, thereafter the time frame

of December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11th 2009 involved in cause No. A-180805

Request Number 244.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not making any representation,

presentation of material facts as acting “Attorney of record” Before

the “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham”, thereafter the date of December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of

November 11st 2009 for the Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray”

legal behalf” in cause No. A-180805

Request Number 245.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not making any representation,

presentation of material facts as acting “Attorney of record” before

The “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham” staff namely “Ms. Sydney Moreau”, thereafter the Date of December 18th 2007

throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 for the Co-Defendant

(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” legal behalf” in cause No. A-180805

Request Number 246.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not making any representation,

presentation of material facts as acting “Attorney of record” before the

Jefferson County Clerk “Lolita Ramos”, record office of Jefferson County Texas thereafter the Date of December 18th 2007

throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 for the Co-Defendant

(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” legal behalf” in cause No. A-180805

Request Number 247.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was not involved in any

“attorney/client”, work product thereof, and making such a presentations and

representations of “material facts” as acting physically in the professional capacity of acting “Attorney of record”

Before the “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham”, against said Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” herein

subject matter in complaint against the Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward

McCray” legal behalf” thereafter of December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 in cause No. A-180805

“Meaning” in that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. “Attorney at Law” Texas Bar No240582299

was not in any shape or form involved in any “attorney/client”, work product

thereof, “attorney/client” communications thereof,

And making such a physical presentations and representations of “material facts”

as acting physically in the professional capacity of acting “Attorney of record”.

Request Number 248.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was (Only) acting in the “legal capacitates”

as a Attorney at Law to file a General Denial (Only) on December 18th
2007

To “simply” reply in the Complaint A-180805 made against Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” (Herein) collectively

and such “legal attorney at law retain services” ended

thereafter the exact date of December 18th 2007 and Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively

there after December 18th 2007 was acting fully “Pro Se” in all legal

matters, and hearing before the court, and all records derive thereof

In a civil suit in the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County Texas filed in Cause No. A-180805

admitting that you “Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein

were legally retain for such legal services to file a General Denial (Only)

Regarding a “Breach of Construction Contract” in excess of $10,800.00 U.S. Dollars

“Your” only being retain for such services, as describe by a contract between

“You” and Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein

For all legal services simply thereof required for such professional legal services to file a simple “General Denial” (Only) on December 18th 2007

Request Number 249.

Admit:

In that Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively was acting as Pro Se (Counsel of record)

and physically involved with inner actions on live “court transcripts” with the

58th Court reporters “Anita Becker” thereafter December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of

November 11st 2009 for the Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” own “legal

behalf” in cause No. A-180805.

Namely that Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein was acting Pro Se (Counsel of record)

on hearing dates of August 28th, 2009 before “58th Court Reporter” Anita Becker”

other than “Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein

Request Number 250.

Admit:

In that Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein was acting as Pro Se (Counsel of record)

and physically involved with inner actions on live “court transcripts” with the 58th Court

reporters “Anita Becker” thereafter December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 for the

Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” own “legal behalf” in cause

No. A-180805.

Namely that Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein was acting Pro Se (Counsel of record)

on hearing date of September 11th 2009 before “58th Court Reporter” Anita Becker”

other than “Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein

Request Number 251.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” Texas Bar No. 24058299 herein

“Your” absolute 100% solid “set” in concrete, stone, chisel ink “You” being named “Chief

Defendant” (Attorney at Law) herein “legally entertaining” such that your “contentions” before a

“Honorable Federal Court of Law” is that one Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively

“Appeared” active before the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County

Texas

In a civil suit in common law in docket No A-180805 and appearing as such before The “Honorable Judge Bob Wortham”

in a legal format as acting “Live” Pro Se Defendant(s) being one “Joyce M.

Guy and Edward McCray” collectively herein fully engage as such under the term as

Pro Se counsel for their very own “legal civil courtroom interest”

In a “Breach of Construction Contract” Complaint filed in connection with the

dwelling and the property located at 448 DeQueen Blvd. in Port Arthur Texas. (Block 172, Lot 1-2)

Your absolute contentions as saying such legal terms of a legal Pro Se Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray” herein collectively

acting physically in a “court of law” within Texas State

Court

Appearing as such against the same said Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II herein from the exact time frame dates of

“December 19th 2007 throughout to the exact date of December 11th

2009” being fully 100% Pro Se for their own legal interest.

Request Number 252.

Admit:

In that Chief Defendant “Antoine L. Freeman, J.D. Texas “Attorney at Law” herein was (Only) acting in the “legal capacitates”

as a Attorney at Law to file a General Denial (Only) on December 18th 2007

To “simply” reply in the Complaint A-180805 made against Co-Defendant(s) “Joyce M. Guy and Edward McCray”

(Herein) collectively and such “legal attorney at law retain services” ended

thereafter the exact date of December 18th 2007

And “You” filed “You're” immediately “Motion for withdrawal of counsel” of record between the exact dates of

December 18th 2007 throughout the exact dates of November 11st 2009 from

cause No. A-180805 filed in Jefferson County Texas Courthouse.